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The 1967 decision of the United States Supreme Court in In re
Gault' established that a juvenile has the right to counsel in juvenile
court proceedings. The Gault decision, however, did not end the
debate concerning the role and professional obligations of that counsel. Prior to Gault, the presence of counsel in juvenile court proceedings was the exception rather than the rule.' The assumed rehabilitative, nonpenal intent of the juvenile justice system created an informal procedure and a courtroom environment which discouraged,
or at best co-existed uneasily with, the lawyer's traditionally adversarial role. 3 Social workers or juvenile court counselors supplanted
or undercut the attorney's function as counselor to his client."
Dispositions relied more upon youth workers' predictions of the
juvenile's behavior and recommendations for treatment or services
than upon the sufficiency of the evidence. 5 In a proceeding where the
*Staff Attorney, Juvenile Justice Legal Advocacy Project, Youth Law Center, San Francisco, California; former Staff Attorney, Mental Patients Advocacy Project, Northampton,
Massachusetts; B.A., Yale College, 1972; M.A., Yale Graduate School, 1975; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1976.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Fewer than 10 percent of respondents in juvenile court received legal representation.
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, Task
Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 82 (1967).
3. W. Stapleton & L. Teitelbaum, In Defense of Youth 64-65 (1972).
4. Brennan & Khinduka, Role Expectations of Social Workers and Lawyers in the Juvenile
Court, 17 Crime & Delinquency 191 (1971); Cayton, Relationshipof the ProbationOfficer and
the Defense Attorney after Gault, 34 Fed. Probation 8, 9 (1970); Edelstein, The Duties and
Functions of theLaw Guardianin theFamily Court, 45 N.Y. St. B.J. 183 (1973); McMillian &
McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in Juvenile Court: Advocate or Social Worker, 14
St. Louis U.L.J. 561, 562 (1970).
5. Ferster & Courtless, Pre-DispositionalData, Role of Counseland Decisions in a Juvenile
Court,7 Law & Soc'y Rev. 195, 206-09 (1972).
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interests of the state and the accused juvenile were assumed to be
identical, an attorney's skills were arguably unnecessary.'
The Gault decision rejected the assumption of identical interests,
asserting the importance of legal assistance to allow the accused
juvenile "to cope with the problems of law, to make skilled inquiry
into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to

ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.'"
Gault extended certain fundamental protections to juvenile defendants, including the privilege against self-incrimination and the right
to confront witnesses. It did not, however, wholly disclaim the view
that because juvenile proceedings are benevolent, attorneys should
play a diminished, or at any rate non-adversarial, role in the proceedings.' Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court and other
courts reinforced the principle that, while juvenile court and adult
criminal proceedings must provide defendants with substantially
similar fundamental due process protections, those proceedings need
not be identical. To some commentators, it seemed logical that the
role and professional obligations of attorneys in the two types of
proceedings should also differ. 9 To others, the traditional adversarial role met the requirements of both types of proceedings; it insured that the unique features of the juvenile justice system in fact
benefited the juvenile client. 10
6. H. Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States 137-38 (1927), cited in Introduction to Institute of Judicial Administration-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating
to Counsel for Private Parties l(Tent. Draft L. Teitelbaum rptr. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Standards]; Teeters & Reineman, The Challenge of Delinquericy 321 (1961).
7. 387 U.S. at 36.
8. Id. at 23-26. See W. Stapleton & L. Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 32-37.
9. Isaacs, The Role of Counsel in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 12 Buffalo
L. Rev. 501 (1963); Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings:A
Non-PolarApproach,61 Geo. L. Rev. 1401, 1410 (1973).
10. The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7. Ethical Considerations 7-1 and 7-19 illustrate the reason why such zealous
and adversarial representation is seen as benefiting not only the client but the justice system as
a whole. Id., Ethical Consideration 7-1, 7-19 [hereinafter Ethical Consideration will be cited
EC]. EC 7-1 states, "The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legalsystem, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 7-1. According to EC 7-19:
Our legal system provides for the adjudication of disputes governed by the rules
of substantive, evidentiary and procedural law. An adversary presentation
counters the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar
that which is not yet fully known; the advocate, by his zealous preparation and
presentation of facts and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an
open and neutral mind and to render impartial judgments.
Id. at 7-19. The United States Supreme Court in Gault similarly assumed that strong adversarial advocacy on behalf of juvenile clients could only further the purposes of the juvenile
justice system. 387 U.S. 1,21-22 (1967).
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This debate among commentators reflects a legitimate and serious
concern among attorneys representing juvenile clients about the
nature and extent of their professional obligations. In the absence of
concrete guidance, attorneys are handicapped in providing the effective representation essential to the preservation of their clients'
rights. Professional ethical canons which propose to address these
difficult issues must recognize the realities of juvenile justice practice
and provide explicit guidelines on how to handle the unique elements
of such practice.
It is not the purpose of this article to review exhaustively the
literature and commentary which surround this debate. Rather, the
article will provide a brief presentation and analysis of the two alternative roles most frequently proposed for attorneys representing
juvenile clients. Particular emphasis will be placed on the practical
as well as ethical difficulties such recommended roles may present.
Next, the article will highlight and comment upon one recent set of
proposed standards as guidelines for attorneys in juvenile justice
proceedings, exploring the ways in which the proposals may or may
not assist attorneys in effective and ethical representation. A short
conclusion will attempt to summarize the key considerations for a
conscientious attorney developing an ethical standard to pursue in
representing the juvenile client.
ALTERNATIVE ROLES-THE ATTORNEY AS
GUARDIAN OR AMICUS CURIAE
In the post-Gault years, youth workers, judges, and attorneys attempted to develop alternative roles for the attorney practicing in
juvenile court. While prevented by Gault from arguing an absolute
identity of interest between juveniles and the court, some of the commentators nevertheless assumed tension existed between "defending" a juvenile client in traditional adversarial fashion and encouraging the client's respect for and understanding of the legal system."
An "amicus curiae" role for the attorney, it was proposed, might
lessen this tension.' 2 Such a role would primarily be geared to assisting the court's decision-making process. The attorney would place
before the court any information, either factual or legal, which
might further its decision-making process. In some cases this could
11. E. Lemert, Social Action and Legal Change: Revolution Within the Juvenile Court 178
(1970); Platt & Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: OccupationalHazards in Juvenile Court,
116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1156 (1968).
12. Walker, The Lawyer-Child Relationship: A Statistical Analysis, 9 Duq. L. Rev. 627, 647
(1971); Comment, The Attorney-Parent Relationship and the Juvenile Court, 12 St. Louis
U.L.J. 603 (1968).
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involve the disclosure of information to the court which an attorney
following an adversarial role would regard as confidential. The
theory is that the attorney, by providing such information, increases
the chances of obtaining an appropriate and beneficial disposition
for the juvenile client. Moreover, the "amicus curiae" role recommends that the attorney act as intermediary between the court and
the juvenile (and in some cases the parents as well), explaining the
purpose and operation of the court process and interpreting the
court's positions and judgment.' 3
Proponents of the "amicus curiae" role generally seem to accept
(or at least to regard as appropriate encouraging the juvenile client
to accept) that the court is concerned with, and acting in, the juvenile's best interests. Thus, the benevolent orientation of the court,
rather than the competency of the juvenile to assist an attorney in
representing him, is the primary justification for the "amicus
curiae" role.' 4 Some proponents, in addition, assume that the accused juvenile, if not actually guilty of the charged offenses, probably needs some services or supervision which an adversarial attorney, by obtaining an acquittal, would prevent him from receiving.
(This concern assumes that the juvenile or his family will refuse to
participate voluntarily in diversion or other social service programs.)
For such clients, the "amicus curiae" attorney might point out the
need for services, both to the juvenile and to the court, and interpret
the court's dispositional order for his client as appropriately requiring the juvenile's participation.'I
The limited competency of the juvenile to identify and assert his
own best interests, on the other hand, is the primary rationale advanced by proponents of the "guardian" role.' 6 The attorney
following such a role independently identifies and then advocates to
the court his judgment of the juvenile's best interests. The "guardian" attorney decides whether to take into account the juvenile's
own expressed desires and, if so, how much weight to give them. He
may exercise his traditional skills to the extent that so doing will
13. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J. Fam. L. 77 (1964);
Stapleton & Teitelbaum, supra note 3. Some commentators urging the adversarial role still
point out the necessity of these mediating and explanatory functions. Genden, Separate Legal
Representationfor Children:Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minors in Juvenile Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565, 590 (1976).
14. Introductionto Standards 6-7; Platt, Schecter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case
of the PublicDefender in Juvenile Court, 43 Ind. L.J. 619, 624 (1968).
15. Platt & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1184.
16. Walker, supra note 12, at 627-28. See also Genden, supra note 13, at 589, recommending deference to a "fully competent" adolescent and a more independent decision making role
for the attorney "[diepending on the age and maturity of the child."
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accomplish the result he has identified as desirable for his client."
Thus, he may in some cases assert or waive the client's rights, or
raise or decline to raise privileges or objections-not to obtain an
acquittal or the least burdensome disposition for his client, but to
obtain an adjudication of delinquency or a restrictive disposition if
such a result is in the client's best interests. The "guardian" role has
been especially recommended for attorneys in cases where the client
is very young and does not have an appointed guardian, or where
there is a perceived conflict of interest between parent and child
which would prevent the attorney from looking to the parent for
guidance." The attorney following the "guardian" role has discretion to pursue a strategy or advocate to the court a disposition to
which the juvenile client objects.
The "guardian" role which permits an attorney to override the expressed desires of his client is consistent with the general rationale
behind the state's authority to intervene in the lives of children who
have committed no crime. Juvenile court jurisdiction over so-called
status offenders is predicated upon the assumption that children, by
virtue of their youth, lack the ability to make competent decisions as
to their well-being.' 9 Thus, behavior which appears to pose a possible danger to the juvenile's health or welfare or which the local community regards as inappropriate for children may justify intervention by the state. Similar state intervention in the lives of adults, by
contrast, can be justified only by a showing of incompetency, for example, through a guardianship proceeding or civil commitment
hearing.2" Juvenile proceedings rest on the dual premises that it is
17. Coxe, Lawyers in the Juvenile Court, 13 Crime & Delinquency 488, 490 (1967). Cf.
Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel,
39 Fordham L. Rev. 375, 383-85 (1971) (suggesting the adversarial role is appropriate for the
adjudication phase and a wider range of roles, including "guardian" type, at disposition).
18. Comment, supra note 12, at 620, outlining possible adversity of interest between parents
and child. See also Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and
Its Implications, 3 Law & Soc'y rev. 491, 548-49 (1969) on delinquency matters in which
parents were complaining witnesses.
19. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Status Offenders and the Juvenile Justice
System: An Anthology (1978); L. Teitelbaum & A. Gough, Beyond Control: Status Offenders
in the Juvenile Court (1977).
20. Paralleling the debate concerning the role of counsel in juvenile court proceedings has
been a similar discussion among attorneys representing allegedly mentally ill, mentally retarded, or elderly clients. Here again, some commentators have criticized the traditional adversarial role as inappropriate in "civil" settings such as commitment hearings, guardianship or
conservatorship proceedings, where the state's purpose is benevolent. Cohen, The Function of
the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally I1, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 424 (1966); R. Rock, M.
Jacobson & R. Janopaul, Hospitalization and Discharge of the Mentally Ill (1968); Galie, An
Essay on the Civil Commitment Lawyer: or How ILearned to Hate the Adversary System, 6 J.
Psych. & L. 71 (1978). As with children, difficulties in communicating with clients have contributed to the issue of incompetency. Limited ability to consult clients on essential matters has
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appropriate to treat juveniles differently from adults and that the
juveniles' incapacity deprives them of certain powers to act for
themselves and also entitles them to special protections.' Indeed,
courts upholding differences in juvenile court procedures have never
held that juveniles are entitled to less protection than adults, but
rather have held that, where changes in procedure contribute to the
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system, they are constitutionally acceptable.22
It is easy to understand the attraction of both the "amicus curiae"
and the "guardian" roles. The first emphasizes the essential professional function of the attorney-to explain and interpret the complexities of the juvenile court system and the applicable law to the
client and his parents. The "amicus curiae" attorney can derive
satisfaction from the belief that he is doubly assisting the course of
justice, by presenting all relevant information to a benevolent court
and by increasing his client's respect for the juvenile justice system.
The "guardian" role helps the lawyer overcome problems caused by
the juvenile client's communication problems or limited understanding. It permits the attorney an approved way out of the frustration
(as common in adult as in juvenile justice practice) of deferring to a
client's judgment which runs contrary to the attorney's assessment
of the best course of action.
The psychological attractions of these alternative roles, however,
are irrelevant to their acceptability from an ethical standpoint. An
attorney must be able to further the goals delineated in Gaultprotection of the juveniles' rights and benefits under law and pursuit
of any legitimate purpose by lawful means. It is from this perspecproduced a confusion of roles or feeling of "rolelessness" among attorneys. See generally
Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counselfor Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a
Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, 33 Alb. L. Rev. 92 (1968); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil
Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 816 (1974).
A number of commentators have argued forcefully in favor of a traditional adversarial role.
See generally James, Handling the Civil Commitment Case, 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 430
(1978); Plotkin, Legal Malpractice: Representing "Mentally Different" Clients, 36
N.L.A.D.A. Briefcase 46 (1979); S. Schwartz & D. Stern, A Trial Manual for Civil Commitment ch. 6 (1976), reprinted in I Mental Disability L. Rep. 380 (1977); Note, The Role of
Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process, 84 Yale L.J. 1540 (1975) (even where severely
handicapped clients are involved); S. Herr, The New Clients: Legal Services for Mentally
Retarded Persons 136-42 (1979); Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and EthicalConsiderations in Representing Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 625
(1979).
21. Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967) with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367
(1970). See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1187,
1191 & n.25 (1970).
22. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); Kent v. United States, 282 U.S. 541
(1966).
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tive, then, that the "amicus curiae" and "guardian" roles will be
assessed.
ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
PRESENTED BY THE ALTERNATIVE ROLES
Underlying both the "guardian" and "amicus curiae" roles is the
unspoken assumption that a juvenile who has come to the attention
of the court is almost always someone for whom state intervention is
appropriate. Even if the actual charges cannot be proven or are in
some respects inaccurate, the juvenile client still is in need of social
services; the juvenile will get into trouble again if not stopped or,
ideally, rehabilitated.2 3 This conviction is shared by youth workers,
police, and court personnel, all of whom have been criticized for
shaping the charges to fit, not the facts of the juvenile's situation,
but the action they wish the state to take (e.g., foster care placement,
secure confinement, psychiatric treatment)."'
If the attorney assumes that his juvenile client will almost always
be "better off" under the jurisdiction of the court than by winning
an acquittal, his discomfort with the traditional adversarial model
becomes acute. Attorneys defending adult clients assume that, whatever the beneficial aspects of criminal sanctions upon society, these
sanctions are unlikely to be experienced other than negatively by the
client. The primarily penal emphasis of the adult criminal justice
system logically requires strong procedural protections against unjust application of such sanctions. 5 Even where the attorney has
reason to believe the client committed the acts alleged, his adversarial role permits him to require the state to prove its case, while he
offers mitigating factors and suggested dispositions which clearly are
intended to serve the client's interest, and only secondarily, or not at
all, the state's. The judge has the responsibility to balance the
defense attorney's suggestions against the interests of the state and
to decide whether a less restrictive disposition may in fact preserve
the state's interest in preventing a repetition of the offense.
The "guardian" role in juvenile court in a sense requires the attorney to perform those judicial functions before developing a strategy
23. Platt & Friedman, supra note 11, at 1184; Kay & Segal, supra note 9, at 1411; Ferster,
Courtless & Snethen, supra note 17, at 400.
24. See Ferster & Courtless, supra note 5, at 207 (court recommendations based on
availability of resources rather than appropriateness of treatment); Platt & Friedman, supra
note 11, at 1175 (attorneys view social workers and court personnel as naive, powerful, and
arbitrary, interested in supporting their own functions within the juvenile justice system).
25. The United States Supreme Court has held that a client is entitled to defense by an advocate on appeal-a right not satisfied by an amicus curiae. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674.(1958).
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or making any recommendation to the judge. Indeed, one of the difficulties with such a role is that it may require the attorney to perform differently at the adjudicatory hearing than at the dispositional
stages. At least theoretically a "guardian" attorney could decide
that his client was not in need of any services proposed by the court
and logically attempt both an acquittal through vigorous adversarial
representation and, failing acquittal, advocacy against any but the
least restrictive placement. Assuming, however, that there is a need
for services or treatment, the "guardian" attorney may be required
not to seek acquittal at the adjudicatory stage so that disposition
may be possible. Where diversionary programs are available and the
client is willing to use them, this may be less of a problem. But what
if the attorney practices in a jurisdiction where there are limited
placements available in the program he prefers for his client, and the
client's eligibility would be increased if he were adjudicated delinquent or otherwise referred under a court order? If then at disposition the "guardian" attorney's strong advocacy for a less restrictive
placement is ineffective, there can be no "taking back" of the
neutral posture assumed at the adjudicatory hearing. This is crucial
because the disposition hearing is far more important than the actual
adjudication in many juvenile justice proceedings. Studies show that
an initial secure placement or referral to a highly restrictive program
affects future placements of a child and creates stigma, whether the
original placement was made because of a status offense or a minor
delinquent act.1 6 Because the original charge, if serious, may imply a
stringent disposition, if the attorney refrains from strong advocacy
at adjudication in the hope of eventually getting a less restrictive
placement, such a strategy might backfire at the time of disposition.
The "amicus curiae" role presents similar ethical difficulties. It
assumes that the primary way in which an attorney can attain a
desirable outcome for the client is by furthering an effective and
complete flow of communication between client and court. Yet this
does not take into account any variation in the impact certain information may have upon the judge, the social worker, or probation officer recommending disposition. It also assumes that the main purpose of the juvenile justice proceeding is disposition, because withholding information to defeat charges against the client is inconsistent with the "amicus curiae" function. Similarly, the role of the
"amicus curiae" attorney at disposition and after is to explain to the
26. Community Research Forum, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Prohibiting
Secure Juvenile Detention: Assessing the Effectiveness of National Standards Detention
Criteria (1979); R. Sarri, Under Lock and Key (1974); Pappenfort & Young, Use of Secure
Detention for Juveniles and Alternatives to Its Use (1977).
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client and his family disposition options and the necessity of complying with the court order. These actions duplicate the functions of the
probation officer or social worker. The attorney, however, may also
advocate a particular disposition, but if he does so as an expression
of the client's wishes, he has departed from the role of an "amicus
curiae." If he simply expresses his own opinion, he is acting as a
"guardian." This switch from the earlier "amicus" role at the adjudicatory stage is confusing for client, attorney, and court, and might
be ineffective in obtaining the desired outcome if the strongest effort
of an adversarial attorney would have been at the adjudicatory hearing, directed toward obtaining acquittal (or, at a minimum, preventing the introduction of damaging or inflammatory evidence).
An argument sometimes introduced by proponents of both the
"guardian" and the "amicus curiae" roles is that a non-adversarial
attorney function helps minimize the trauma of the juvenile justice
proceedings for the client."7 A similar argument was used in support
of the informal proceedings challenged in Gault and considered
again in judicial decisions upholding some distinctions between juvenile court and adult procedures. "8 There is no question that involvement of a juvenile in the court system is a stressful and oftentimes
frightening situation for both the juvenile and the parents. The
ethical issue for an attorney, however, is whether waiving or softening the procedural protections and formality of an adult hearing,
although making the client more comfortable, will ultimately place
him at a disadvantage.
The informal courtroom atmosphere often has been linked to
loose enforcement of the rules of evidence, opening the door to opinion, hearsay, and conjecture. Encouraging complete family and
client candor with court personnel, probation officers, or courtappointed psychologists may produce problems when these people
introduce evidence or testify to opinions based upon the candid communications. Overall, the biggest risk of informality in courtroom
atmosphere and procedure is that it will support an unspoken
assumption that the hearing is chiefly or solely to determine what to
do about (or for) the juvenile. If such an assumption is not challenged by the attorney, there is a danger that the essential prelim27. Genden, supra note 13, at 592; Sarri, supra note 26, at 22; Children's Defense Fund of
the Washington Research Project, Children in Adult Jails 29 (1976), discuss generally the issue
of trauma. But see J. Ensminger & T. Liguori, The Therapeutic Potential of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. Psych. & L. 4 (1978), arguing for the therapeutic
benefits of legal proceedings for mentally disabled clients.
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26; State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 167 N.W. 830 (1918). See also
S. Wheeler & L. Cottrell, Juvenile Delinquency: Its Prevention and Control (1966).
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inary issues of jurisdiction, burden of proof, and sufficiency of
evidence will only perfunctorily be addressed. Thus the juvenile's attorney, by permitting informality, will have tacitly conceded the
state's right to intervene.
Adopting a "guardian" role can involve an attorney in usurping
judicial functions. It, as well as the "amicus curiae" function, may
also negate the function of the legislature. The premise underlying
the right to counsel in Gault is that the juvenile client, like an adult
client, is entitled to the protection of all the rights he has under law.
He is also entitled to pursue any lawful purpose by lawful means. 9
Primary among these legal protections is the right to force the state
to prove its case against him. An attorney who counsels the client to
waive this right, not because this is the most effective tactical move
but because as "amicus curiae" he wants the court to have all possible information about the juvenile's guilt, is in effect telling the
legislature and the juvenile courts that the procedures they have provided are unnecessary. Where a legislature has defined, for example,
criteria justifying secure detention and the attorney as "amicus
curiae" does not strongly argue to the court that his client fails to
meet those criteria, the attorney in effect is disregarding the legislature's judgment as to what types of juveniles the state has a legitimate interest in confining. The juvenile client has a right to have the
state prove that he falls in that category, and the attorney's action
negates that right. Moreover, the legislature has determined that the
state has no interest in confining a child not in that category.
Similarly, for the attorney to permit his client who does not meet the
statutory criteria to be confined because, as "guardian," he thinks it
would benefit the juvenile is an act inconsistent with the judgment of
the legislature. In sum, an attorney who adopts either alternative
role replaces the judgment of legislators and judges with his own to
the detriment of a juvenile justice system which requires the playing
out of a complex procedural process to operate correctly.
Quite apart from the practical difficulties of implementing a nonadversarial role, there remains a serious philosophical objection.
The legal profession as a whole has defined the appropriate functions and obligations of an attorney, not merely as an exercise in
self-definition, but as a way of informing the public about our services. In plain language, as a profession we represent that an attorney does certain things for a client that one layperson cannot do
for another. We support attorney-client confidentiality to reassure
the client about the special nature of that relationship. We develop
29. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)
[hereinafter Disciplinary Rule will be cited DR]; id., EC 7-1; see note 35 infra.
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ethical standards which provide guidance for our clients as well as
for ourselves as to what is expected from us in the way of professional skills, loyalty, and integrity. When we agree to be someone's
attorney, we are agreeing to perform the function and role which
were thus defined. If what we are actually planning to be is
somebody's "guardian," or "amicus curiae," or some combination,
based on our own emotional reactions to the client or our own psychological convenience, we have defrauded the client. In most cases
the client (and this is especially true in juvenile cases) will have no
standard against which to measure our efforts in his behalf, so he
may never know whether we have actually represented him (as a lawyer would an adult), or whether we have acted as his guardian or as
the friend of the court. Certainly the juvenile court personnel are not
likely to object to our deviation from the traditional adversarial role;
on the contrary, they are the very individuals whose orientation
makes them uncomfortable with attorneys who are strong advocates. The lack of an effective monitoring presence to assess whether
the attorney is functioning as an adversarial advocate or in some
other role inconsistent with the profession's representation, makes
the attorney's understanding of his proper role all the more crucial.
Appearing as counsel while really acting as a "guardian" or
"amicus curiae" presents a final ethical problem. The juvenile client
may not be the only one who is falsely reassured by the presence of
counsel. The records of juvenile proceedings on appeal reveal that
the presence of counsel creates a presumption of compliance with
due process requirements. 3" A judge hearing a case where a juvenile
clearly is without the assistance of counsel may feel bound by the
judicial canons of ethics to assist the juvenile, or at a minimum, to
weigh lightly evidence introduced against the juvenile which an
effective attorney would have challenged." This is not an argument
30. The plea of ineffective assistance of counsel is of course available on appeal, but likely
to be difficult to assert successfully. Bazelon, Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 Cin. L. Rev.
-,
249
1 (1973). However, a class action decision in Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276,
N.W.2d 573, 577 (1977) found that the legal representation of defendants in civil commitment
cases, provided by a closed panel of six court appointed attorneys over a period of more than
one year, systematically violated the defendants' rights to due process of law and the effective
assistance of counsel. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in that case stated that it is a constitutional requirement that legal representation be provided. A Wisconsin statute further required
that those attorneys act in an adversarial role. See also Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp.
1113, 1129 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), judgment reentered, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 238, 517 P.2d 568, 577
(1974).
31. This is, of course, highly idealistic, but the author has encountered at least one judge
who stated that he is more apt to regard himself as the juvenile's advocate if there is no attoriey and thus to disregard inadmissible evidence or consider more placement options than if
ihere is ineffective counsel present.
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in favor of providing no counsel; the experience of juvenile courts
prior to Gault clearly indicates that this practice contributed to a
widespread violation of the juvenile defendant's constitutional
rights. 2 It is an argument for insisting that an attorney do more than
just be present during the procedure; he should insure that due process requirements are actually met.
THE IJA-ABA STANDARDS-ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
One volume in the series of standards and commentary developed
by the Institute of Judicial Administration-American Bar Association Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards 3 specifically
addresses the question of the appropriate role for attorneys repre3 4 Professor
senting juveniles. In Counsel for Private Parties
Teitelbaum sets out and discusses standards for representing minors
not only in juvenile justice proceedings, including status offense
hearings, but in abuse and neglect proceedings as well. The Standards attempt, usually successfully, to resolve the debate over the
appropriate use of a traditional adversarial role in the juvenile
justice system. While coming down strongly in favor of the adversarial role, the Standards nevertheless acknowledge the special needs
of juvenile clients by viewing the attorney as counselor as well as advocate.
The general thrust of the Standards is that the attorney representing a juvenile is bound by the same ethical obligations as any other
attorney, including the obligation to represent zealously his client
within the bounds of the law. This obligation, the commentary
notes, is predicated upon the client's right to have his legally
available rights and benefits protected and to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means.3 5
32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 34-42.
33. In the spring of 1977 the Institute of Judicial Administration-American Bar Association
Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards released twenty-three volumes of proposed
standards and commentary. The volumes were the product of the Juvenile Justice Standards
Project undertaken by IJA in 1971 and co-sponsored by ABA since 1973. The Project addressed a widely acknowledged need for extensive analysis of the United States juvenile justice
system coupled with comprehensive recommendations to guide professionals, and state and
social service agencies involved in that system. The proposed standards and commentary were
intended to identify and codify developing concepts and policy directions in the area of
juvenile justice and to promote uniformity and fundamental fairness among the justice systems
of the different states.
34. Standards; see note 6supra.
35. The Standards cite the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, DR 7101(A), which provides that counsel's duty is to seek the "lawful objectives of his client
through all reasonably available means permitted by law," and cite EC 7-1 which says:
The duty of the lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent
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Throughout the Standards, three key concepts are introduced and
developed: the juvenile's need for the assistance of an attorney at
key stages throughout the juvenile justice process; the obligation of
the attorney to consult the juvenile, as he would an adult client, on
essential matters and to honor the client's decision; and the duty to
protect the right of the juvenile client of limited or uncertain competency as vigorously as he would protect the rights of any other
client. A primary example of how those concepts are applied to the
controversy over the attorney's role is the commentary's statement
on identification of the juvenile's interest. The Standards reject any
assumption of identity of interest between the state and the accused
juvenile. They leave it within the powers of the client, after consultation with the attorney, to decide whether, in his particular case, such
identity exists.3 6 Generally, the ability of the client to participate
meaningfully in this identification of his interests is implied throughout the Standards. Where a client's capacity may be affected by extreme youth, mental disability, or other cause, the Standards provide
additional guidance.37 However, the prevailing view throughout the
Standards appears to be that such difficulties only underline the
attorney's duty to seek effective communication and consultation
with the juvenile and do not justify adoption of a "guardian" or
"amicus curiae" role.3 8
Attorney's Relationshipwith Court Personnel
The attorney's function as the protector of his juvenile client's
rights in any interactions with court personnel is discussed in one of
the earliest Standards. The lawyer is required to cooperate with
social work and probation departments and agencies and to instruct
the client to do so." This Standard reflects an understanding of the
practical benefit to attorney and client of being on good terms with
the individuals recommending dispositions to the court. It also addresses the concern of some commentators that the attorney's attitude toward court personnel influences the juvenile client's attitude.
his client zealously within the bounds of the law. . . . The professional responsibility of the lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the
duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal
rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not men, each member of our
society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with
the law; to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to
present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue or defense.
Standards at 3-4.
36. Introduction to Standards at 5-7; Standards, Std 3.l(b)(i).
37. See text accompanying notes 59 through 63 infra.
38. Introductionto Standards at 3, 8; Standards, Std 4.2 note, at 99-101.
39. Standards, Std 1.4.
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However, there is an important condition: cooperation is required
unless it is inconsistent with protecting the client's legitimate interests in the proceeding or other rights under law. 0
This Standard sets the tone for all subsequent recommendations

for attorney interaction with the court system on behalf of his client.
To the extent that it is consistent with the attorney's primary task of
protecting the client's rights, the attorney may and even should
utilize those features of the juvenile justice system which reflect its
arguably nonpenal, benevolent orientation. Thus conferences with
court social workers and probation officers, exploration of diversion
programs, referral for social, psychological, psychiatric, or other
services, may all be appropriately pursued where attorney and client
agree they may benefit the client."' Yet the attorney's continuing
duties both to consult his client on significant decisions and to keep
his client informed of the progress of the case should avoid the
evidentiary and tactical problems discussed above."2 They may also
have the desirable effect of increasing the client's understanding of
the working of the juvenile justice system and in particular the role
of the attorney. '
Right to Assistance of Attorney
The Standards acknowledge the importance of providing the juvenile access to legal assistance from the time he enters the juvenile
justice system. They require that counsel be provided for a juvenile
subject to delinquency or in need of supervision charges, not only
during the adjudicatory hearing, as is the practice in many states,"
but:
40. Id.
41. Standards, Stds 1.4, 4.3, 5.2, 6.2.
42. Standards, Stds 3.1(b), 3.5, 5.1.
43. Standards, Std 3.5 note, at 96.
44. A distinction must be made between statutes which permit representation of the juvenile
by counsel at any stage of the juvenile justice system and those which provide for counsel by
court appointment. Attorneys retained by parents or by the client privately may begin their
representation of the client at the initial stage of intake. Clients unable to afford an attorney
may receive court appointed counsel only for the purposes of representation at a detention
review hearing or formal adjudication. Because effective advocacy early in the process may
make the difference between dismissal of charges on participation in a diversion program or
adjudication and placement after prolonged secure detention, the importance of providing
legal representation to the juvenile as early as possible should be clear. While not explicitly requiring court appointment of counsel at intake, the Standards codify case law requiring such
counsel at detention, transfer, and parole revocation hearings. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975) (detention-adults); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (parole revocation of
adults); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (transfer); Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258
(5th Cir. 1975) (detention-juveniles); Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1973)
(intake procedural protections-juveniles); Shone v. Maine, 406 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1969)
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in all proceedings arising from or related to a delinquency or in
need of supervision action, including mental competency, transfer, postdisposition, probation revocation, and classification,
institutional transfer, disciplinary or other administrative proceedings related to the treatment process which may substantially affect the juvenile's custody, status or course of treatment.
The nature of the forums and the formal classification of the
proceedings is irrelevant for this purpose."5
The situations outlined as requiring access to the assistance of an
attorney encompass the gamut of juvenile justice system proceedings, from the initial intake stage to post-judicial administrative
reviews. The crucial criterion for deciding whether an attorney's
presence is required is not whether the meeting or proceeding takes
place in court, but whether it will have a significant effect upon the
juvenile's custody, status, or course of treatment. 4 6 This is precisely
the criterion which should be used. Many decisions which result in
serious deprivation or abridgement of a juvenile's liberty or other
fundamental rights are made outside the adjudicatory hearing. An
informal conference of social workers, where the juvenile client is
not present but is discussed as one of several cases on the court
docket, may be the critical meeting which determines the placement
recommendation made to the court. The recommendation may be
based upon information obtained by a social worker which is not in
the'juvenile's record, and is not admissible in the court proceedings
proper. An effective attorney would make a point of first, knowing
of the existence of the meeting, and second, representing the client
there. The broad-based language of this Standard alerts the attorney
to his obligation to know of any situation which affects his client's
interests and not to concentrate only on those in-court proceedings
where a lawyer seems most obviously needed.
Attorney's Duty to Explore Alternatives
No duty of the attorney is more critical to effective advocacy than
the investigation of alternatives, whether at the intake stage or in
preparation for the disposition hearing. The lack of available place(institutional transfer); Silbert v. Cohen, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908 (1971) (parole revocation-juveniles). See also Ralston, Intake: Informal Disposition or Adversary Proceeding, 17
Crime & Delinquency 160 (1971); Rosenheim & Skoler, The Lawyer's Role at Intake and
Detention Stages of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 Crime & Delinquency 167 (1965).
45. Standards, Std 2.3(a)(ii). The issue of providing counsel for juveniles unable to afford
private counsel is addressed in Standards 2.1 and 2.2, which regulate the organization of
assigned counsel systems and outline the special qualifications and skills recommended for
juvenile justice attorneys. Standards, Stds 2.1, 2.2.
46. Standards, Stds 2.3, 2.4.
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ments in existing alternatives to detention and the limited range of
program models for juveniles have been well documented."7 The
relationship of those deficiencies to inappropriate and overly restrictive placements of juveniles in the juvenile justice system has
likewise been well established. 8 In the absence of a feasible alternative suggested by counsel for the juvenile, many judges will feel inclined or forced to accept the recommendation of the probation
department for secure pretrial detention or for post-adjudication
placement in an overly restrictive but immediately available program.
Because the issue of placement seems to involve social work or
medical and social science expertise, there is a tendency for attorneys
to rely upon the findings of the court personnel as to available and
appropriate program options and to confine their own investigative
efforts to the facts alleged in the charges against their client. The
Standards require the attorney, at the outset of representation, to investigate social or legal dispositional alternatives and remind him
that prompt action, in this as in other regards, is necessary in order
to protect the juvenile's rights.49 When preparing for the hearing on
disposition, the attorney has a duty to familiarize himself with the
available alternatives and community resources from which a disposition plan may be developed.5 ° He should obtain access to any
sources of information which the court will consider at disposition,
including social, psychological, or psychiatric reports, and proceed
to study and independently investigate them.' IRegardless of the
47. Major sources supporting these findings include: Hearings on the Detention and Jailing
of Juveniles Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, S. Res. 56, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1973); Vintner, Time Out: A National Study
of Juvenile Correctional Programs (1976); Children in Adult Jails, supra note 27; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, NAC Task Force Report on
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1976).
48. See Y. Bakal, Closing Correctional Institutions (1973); Cost and Service Impacts of
Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders in Ten States: Responses to Angry Youth (1977);
The Impact of Alternatives to Incarceration in Alaska (1977); L. Ohlin, A. Miller & R. Coates,
Juvenile Correctional Reform in Massachusetts (1977); R. Vintner, G. Downs & J. Hall,
Juvenile Corrections in the States: Residential Programs and Deinstitutionalization (1975).
49. Standards, Std 4.1.
50. Standards, Stds 4.3, 9.2. These requirements reinforce ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 7, EC 7-8:
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A
lawyer ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do so.
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations. A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative. . . .In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember
that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods
because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.
51. Standards, Std 9.2(b). See also Standards, Std 8.2 (transfer proceedings).
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availability of such reports, the attorney must independently investigate any of the client's circumstances which will be relevant to
disposition. Where this type of report or information is not available
to the court, the attorney should obtain whatever professional or expert consultation is necessary to the formulation of a dispositional
plan.52
It cannot be overemphasized how often such investigation of
resources and obtaining of information concerning the client's needs
will be the primary services the attorney can perform. The sole criticism of the Standards on this point is that the detailed delineation of
all the attorney's options and duties should not have been reserved
for the section on disposition. The attorney should not wait until
disposition is imminent before undertaking the investigation of
alternatives. From the outset of representation, at the intake and
pretrial detention phases as well as at disposition, he should discuss
with the client and, where appropriate, with parents the available
treatment and services options. The ability to appear in court with a
placement or treatment plan supported by both parents and client is
an important tactical weapon. Moreover, early and in-depth discussion with client and parents encourages them to develop and assert
their own suggestions concerning an appropriate response to the circumstances which brought the juvenile into the justice system.
Knowing that they need not rely upon the court's personnel for judgments as to what is best for the juvenile allows client and parents to
support the attorney in insisting on the juvenile's right to dismissal
of the charges or participation in a diversion program where the
state's case is weak. Even if the case proceeds to adjudication and
court-ordered disposition, full participation by the juvenile client
and parents in formulating the disposition plan may motivate the
juvenile to comply with the court order.' 3
At the intake phase, or at any time during the juvenile justice process, the attorney may, in discussing available resources and services, learn that the client, and possibly the parents, are interested in
52. Standards, Std 9.2(c). See also Standards, Std 9.3 (court-ordered examinations).
53. Standards, Std 7.5 note, at 144-45. This Standard emphasizes the importance of a professional demeanor in relationships with parents and court personnel as well as the juvenile
client, suggesting that such behavior will increase client confidence in the justice process. Standard 9.5, referring to counseling after disposition, requires the attorney to "urge upon the
client the need for accepting and cooperating with the dispositional order," even where the
order is to be appealed. As part of that counseling role, it might be helpful for the attorney to
remind the client of his own obligation, under Standard 7.4, to comply with all rules, orders,
and decisions of the court. A distrustful juvenile client who believes that the attorney is simply
one of many adults with authority to make decisions concerning the juvenile's placement or
care may develop increased confidence upon learning the extent to which counsel is bound by,
and attempts skillfully to utilize, the procedures and powers of the court.
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utilizing them. It is entirely appropriate for the attorney to facilitate
this process, even (or especially) independent of or subsequent to the
court proceedings, and the Standards recommend that he do so."
From the perspective of an adversarial attorney, it is not inconsistent
to defend a juvenile client against a charge which might result in a
finding of delinquency or court-ordered treatment while arranging
for the juvenile's voluntary participation in the same or some other
type of therapy or service program. The difference between the two
results is the difference between an abridgment by the state of the
juvenile's liberty, with its accompanying stigma, and the juvenile's
exercise of that liberty in recognizing and acting upon his need for
services. By the same token, an adversarial attorney who believes his
client to be in need of treatment or services is in no way prevented by
the Standards from advising him to seek them and offering his
assistance in that process. The distinction between such action and
pursuing the "guardian" role lies in the "guardian" attorney's option of recommending that the court order such treatment or services
where the client remains unconvinced. The Standards explicitly provide that the attorney ordinarily should not make or agree to a specific dispositional alternative without the client's consent. 5
Decision to Request Independent Expert Evaluation
The decision to independently seek social, psychological, or
psychiatric reports on the juvenile client remains with the attorney,
56
but the Standards generally imply that such reports are desirable.
In many cases the adversarial attorney may indeed wish to obtain
such information where court personnel have not, or to request an
independent professional interview of the client so that an independent report can be compared to existing probation records. However, the opinion or report of an independent expert is chiefly useful
only where it raises a doubt concerning the accuracy of the prosecution or probation officer's diagnosis and recommendation or
strongly supports the defense's recommendation for a less restrictive
dispositional plan. The adversarial attorney should be skeptical of
the chances of obtaining such support from an expert who routinely
is assigned by the court to perform "independent" reviews." Ob54. Standards, Stds 4.3(b), 10.1(a)(ii).
55. Standards, Std 9.3 (a).
56. Standards, Stds 9.2(b)(i), 10.1(a)(ii).
57. Of course, there will be exceptions, but in many jurisdictions the professionals available
by court appointment to perform diagnostic or social services reviews in juvenile justice cases
will have a conservative orientation, in favor of secure confinement or institutional placement
where this is recommended by probation or the prosecution. In some cases these are the same
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viously, it is much more damaging to have two reports recommending secure custody for a client than one, especially when the second
has been requested by the juvenile's attorney.
To avoid this result, the attorney should be advised to seek services from professionals who are truly independent of the court and
to arrange for payment of their fees by the court where the client is
indigent." Just as would be done in a personal injuries case, the attorney must obtain names of qualified experts and find one who,
after being apprised of the facts, will be able to strongly support the
disposition proposed or relief requested by counsel. The Standards'
recommendation that professional services be obtained for a
juvenile client where appropriate is praiseworthy. The potential pitfall is that this recommendation will be followed only to the extent
of automatic referral for an initial or additional review by a courtappointed "regular" expert. Such a referral will reassure the attorney that he has done the right thing but will also seriously undermine
any subsequent advocacy for a dispositional alternative not recommended by the expert.
Decision to Request a GuardianAd Litem
Analogous to the dilemma of whether to seek a professional opinion is the issue of whether to request a guardian ad litem. At first
glance, the appointment of a guardian seems the obvious way to
avoid the conflict between the adversarial attorney's role and the
factors which give rise to the suggested alternative roles for attorneys.5 9 Yet, in a situation where the alleged inability of the child
professionals called upon for opinions as to competency to stand trial or criminal responsibility
in adult cases; they may have no special expertise or insight into juvenile mental health problems or familiarity with treatment modalities. By dint of long-standing relationships with the

courts, however, such professionals may have considerable credibility, and a recommendation
from them may be difficult to counteract.
58. The difficulty of this will, of course, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In situations

where the local juvenile court judges are particularly inclined to assign a few "regular" professionals and to rely upon their judgment, it will be necessary to convince the court of the special
professional qualifications of the proposed expert and of the juvenile client's unusual situation. This can be done readily as part of the process of finding an appropriate expert where an
indigent client is involved. As a rule, the reimbursement provided by the court will be inadequate compensation for the professional's services at the going rate. The attorney may have to
entice an expert into testifying by stressing the unusual fact situation of his client or the gross
inappropriateness of the disposition proposed. Thus an expert on developmental disability may

be persuaded to testify in a case where the juvenile's diagnosis as mentally retarded is central to
the disposition; a professional studying behavior of adolescent minority women may be interested in a status offense case involving cultural conflicts. The reasons why an expert agrees
to participate in a case (special interest and familiarity with new developments in treatment
modalities) may be used to persuade the court of the appropriateness of ordering compensation.
.59. See text accompanying notes 11-22 supra.
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to make reasoned judgments in his own best interest is the essence of
the charge against him, the attorney's action in requesting a guardian may be tantamount to a concession on the merits. In addition,
some courts routinely appoint the same individuals as guardians ad
litem, a practice which may result in the adversarial attorney's looking for direction to a guardian who is inclined to support the recommendations of the court social worker or probation officer. These
considerations should not, of course, prevent the conscientious attorney from requesting a guardian where this course is the only one
which will enable the client's rights to be adequately defined and advocated.
The Standards recommend that even when a guardian is appointed, the attorney should consult the juvenile client as well as the
guardian concerning essential matters.6 0 Where the client and guardian ad litem substantially disagree about the juvenile's best interest,
the Standards permit the attorney to so inform the court. 6' Never-

theless, few courts are likely to act contrary to the judgment of the
guardian ad litem, especially where the attorney's reason for advocating a different action is because an incompetent client so desires.
Often the difficulty the attorney experiences in consulting the
juvenile about those decisions which the Standards require attorney
and client to make together is the basis for an attorney's belief that a
guardian should be appointed. It is important to realize that a juvenile's difficulty in communicating with an attorney is not necessarily
an indication of limited or inadequate ability to make reasoned judgments. The unfamiliarity of legal terminology and the stress of involvement in the juvenile justice system, coupled with the disparity
in power between adult and child, are among the factors which could
contribute to such difficulty. An additional factor named by the
Standards is extreme youth; 62 others may include mental disability,
symptoms of drug addiction or alcoholism, cultural differences be60. Standards, Std 3.1(b)(ii)(c)(l).
61. Standards, Std 3.1(b) note, at 81-82. For a discussion of the ethical considerations involved in representing adult clients with guardians ad litem, see Mickenberg, The Silent
Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerationsin Representing Severely and Profoundly Retarded
Individuals, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 625 (1979).
62. Standards, Std 3. 1(c). The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, EC 7-1l
and 7-12 discuss the lawyer's responsibility in cases where the client's physical or mental condition affects his ability to make judgments in his own behalf.
The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or age of a client, the obligation of a public officer, or
the nature of a particular proceeding. Examples include the representation of an
illiterate or an incompetent, service as a public prosecutor or other government
lawyer, and appearance before administrative and legislative bodies.
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, EC 7-11.
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tween attorney and client, and passivity or suspicion produced by
previous experiences with the juvenile justice system. Many of these
factors may be overcome by sensitivity to the juvenile client's
perspective and by frequent and consistent efforts to explain the
attorney's role, to perform actions clearly beneficial to the client,
and to preserve confidentiality. 63 Depending upon the degree of difficulty, however, it may be necessary to seek assistance from someone with whom the juvenile has already established communication
and trust. Friends, neighbors, relatives (including other juveniles),
as well as teachers, youth workers, and other commonly consulted
authority figures may perform essential functions as mediators or
"cultural translators" in at least some initial conversations between
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities
upon his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other
legal representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for those decisions
which are normally the prerogative of the client to make. If a client under
disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client. If the client is capable of
understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the advancement of
his interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all possible aid. If the disability of a
client and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer to make decisions
for his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and
act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client. But obviously
the lawyer cannot perform any act or make any decision which the law requires
his client to perform or make, either acting for himself if competent, or by a duly
constituted representative if legally incompetent.
Id., EC 7-12.
Clearly the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the attorney with some discretion
as to the situations in which he is compelled to make decisions for his client. The strong
language throughout these two Ethical Considerations argues against taking any such action
where it is possible to obtain aid from the client, even if only in general by identifying those interests which the attorney is bound to protect and promote.
63. The Standards regarding confidentiality mandate the preservation of confidentiality between attorney and client in juvenile cases as in adult cases; there are, however, a few exceptions. Standard 3.3(d) permits disclosure of confidences or secrets with the informed consent
of the juvenile client, or without consent where such disclosure will not disadvantage the
juvenile, will further the interests of the juvenile and the juvenile is incapable of considered
judgment. The attorney must reveal an intention by the client to commit a crime or an act
which would be criminal if done by an adult where the act would seriously endanger his health
or safety or that of others. This Standard follows the Code of Professional Responsibility DR
4-101(C) regarding circumstances in which confidentiality must be breached. The additional
Standards on confidentiality regulate the communications between parents and attorney,
recognizing that effective representation may involve frank and highly personal communications concerning family circumstances, but that the attorney's primary responsibility is to the
juvenile client. Standard 3.3(c)(i) urges the attorney not to encourage parents' secret communications where disclosure may become necessary for effective representation of the
juvenile. The attorney may preserve a parent's confidential communication where so doing
does not interfere with the discharge of his duty to the juvenile client. The communication may
be disclosed, however, with the parent's informed consent or where the disclosure is necessary
to the attorney's representation of the client. Standards, Std 3.3(c)(ii).
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attorney and client. Obviously such an arrangement raises some confidentiality issues, but the attorney, or ideally the third party, could
be encouraged to obtain the juvenile's permission, and the attorney
and client must discuss the purpose of third party presence. Consulting other individuals may provide the additional benefit of finding a desirable candidate for guardian ad litem, should one be
necessary.
Attorney's Duty in Absence of GuardianAdLitem
Active representation of a juvenile client which involves recruiting
independent experts and concerned third parties is consistent with
the Standards' underlying principle that a client's youth should not
change the attorney's obligation to provide effective advocacy. Surprisingly, however, where there is no guardian ad litem or other independent advisor and the client is very young, the Standards permit
the attorney to maintain a neutral posture.
Where a guardian ad litem has not been appointed and, for
some reason, it appears that independent advice to the juvenile
will not otherwise be available, counsel should inquire thoroughly into all circumstances that a careful and competent person in the juvenile's position should consider in determining the
juvenile's interests with respect to the proceeding. After consultation with the juvenile, the parents (where their interests do
not appear to conflict with the juvenile's) and any other family
members or interested persons, the attorney may remain neutral
concerning the proceeding, limiting participation to presentation
and examination of material evidence or, if necessary, the attorney may adopt the position requiring the least intrusive intervention justified by the juvenile's circumstances."
The rationale behind such permission is apparently that the attorney's extensive investigation may reveal that a neutral posture is
appropriate. Unfortunately, the Standards do not provide criteria by
which the attorney is to reach this decision. If the attorney is convinced that presenting and examining the material evidence is sufficient to accomplish the result which someone in the juvenile's position would desire, a neutral posture may be appropriate. But if he is
uncertain what someone in that position would want, maintaining a
neutral posture presents the ethical problem discussed above. 6 ' The
language of this Standard is especially unhelpful because it offers the
attorney the additional option of arguing in favor of the least restric64. Standards, Std 3.1(b)(ii)(c)(3).
65. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
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tive intervention justified by the juvenile's circumstances without
providing any criteria to indicate when such a position should be
adopted.
The principle that, when the state denies or abridges an individual's fundamental rights, even for a legitimate purpose, it must
do so only by the least drastic means, has long been applied to juvenile justice and custody proceedings. 66 Giving the attorney discretion
whether or not to force the state to so justify its proposed action runs
contrary to the Standards' overall position that a juvenile client, no
less than an adult, has a right to legal assistance to protect his lawful
rights and benefits. If he exercises the client's right to the least
restrictive intervention, the attorney need not speculate as to what an
individual in the juvenile's position would want. As a matter of constitutional law and judicial principle, it may be assumed the client
would want no more state intervention than necessary to accomplish
its legitimate purpose. A better Standard for attorneys representing
young clients without the assistance of a guardian ad litem would be
to require affirmative, adversarial advocacy in favor of the least

restrictive intervention.
CONCLUSION
Representing a juvenile client undoubtedly causes the attorney to
confront a variety of practical as well as ethical issues. Communicating with a client of apparently limited capacity to formulate
or to express judgments can be extraordinarily frustrating. Resisting
the pressures of court personnel to adopt a non-adversarial stance is
especially difficult when the attorney knows that, in a capacity as
guardian, he would override the decisions his client has made. Yet
66. The underlying constitutional principle of "least drastic means" was first set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Applied to the rights
of residents at a state institution for the mentally ill in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 396
(M.D. Ala. 1972), the concept was relied upon by the Court in finding a right of the residents
"to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of habilitation." The constitutional principle has been applied to hold that juvenile delinquents have a right to treatment
in the least restrictive setting appropriate to the purposes of confinement. Morales v. Turman,
383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), reinstated,430 U.S. 322
(1977); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), supplemented, 359 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Gary W.
v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976); Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419
F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), supporting the right to treatment for juveniles which has been
linked with the right to the least restrictive alternative in mental health cases. Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Dixon v. Weinberger,
405 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D.D.C. 1975). For clinical theory supporting the least intrusive intervention in the lives of children, see J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973).
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neither the difficulties of the attorney's task nor the attractions of
any alternative role justify professional behavior which is inconsistent with the purpose for which a right to counsel was guaranteed to
juvenile clients by the United States Supreme Court. The differences
between juvenile and adult clients and their justice systems raise the
issue not of whether the attorney must provide them with the same
level of loyalty, advocacy, and professional skill, but only of how.
In answering that question, each attorney must ultimately be
responsible for a review of his professional performance according
to the purposes approved in Gault. Is an action of the attorney consistent with protecting the rights and benefits to which the client is
entitled under law, including the right to a full panoply of due process protections? Regardless of the attorney's approval, does a decision of the client represent a legitimate purpose or objective which
the attorney can legally pursue in his behalf? If the answer is affirmative, the attorney's duty to take the action or to pursue the objective is clear. By detailing the essential steps and options available to
him at every stage of juvenile representation, the IJA-ABA Standards provide valuable assistance to the attorney in carrying out that
duty.

